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THE LUCE LECTURES ON RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS 
Morality in Plague Time: 
AIDS in Theological Perspective 
Lecture 2: Obligations - Caring for the Sick 
Gilbert Meilaender 
At some threshold, hard to define, we will conclude that it is 
unreasonable to expect people in general to sacrifice themselves 
and those to whom they have close personal ties to the general 
good. l 
In one of the short stories in which he plays a part, a fictional physician 
whose name you will immediately recognize, is called to the bedside of a 
dear friend who is dying of a little known, but highly infections disease . 
Not realizing how dreadfully contagious is his friend's illness, the doctor 
steps toward the bed . 
"Stand back! Stand right back!" said he with the sharp imperiousness 
which 1 had associated only with moments of crisis .... " 
Taken aback, the physician assumes his friend is delirious, but that 
impression is immediately corrected . "I know what is the matter with 
me . . .. It is infallibly deadly, and it is horribly contagious." 
To which Dr. Watson replies : "Good heavens, Holmes! Do you suppose 
that such a consideration weighs with me for an instant? It would not affect 
me in the case of a stranger. Do you imagine it would prevent me from 
doing my duty to so old a friend?"2 
Against this wonderful evocation of the meaning of the physician's 
calling, enunciated, we should note, by one who is himself a physician and 
not by an outsider deliberating about the obligations of physicians , let us 
place another paragraph from another work offiction. In Defoe's Journal 
of the Plague Year, the saddler who narrates the story writes briefly of 
events after the plague had begun to abate and many who had fleq returned 
to their homes. 
Great was the reproach thrown on those physicians who left their patients 
during the sickness, and now they came to town again nobody cared to employ 
them. They were called deserters , and frequently bills were set up upon their 
doors and written. " Here is a doctor to be let," so that several of those physicians 
were fain for a while to sit still and look about them, or at least remove their 
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dwellings and set up in new places and among new acquaintance. The like was the 
case with the clergy, whom the people were indeed very abusive to, writing verses 
and scandalous reflections upon them, setting upon the church door, "Here is a 
pUlpit to be let ," or sometimes, "to be sold ," which was worse . .. . The 
Dissenters reproaching those ministers of the Church with going away and 
deserting their charge, abandoning the people in their danger, and when they had 
most need of comfort, and the like, this we could by no means approve, for all 
men have not the same faith and the same courage, and the Scripture commands 
us to judge the most favourably and according to charity. 
A plague is a formidable enemy, and is armed with terrors that every man is not 
sufficiently fortified to resist or prepared to stand the shock against . . .. And we 
should have considered that such a time as this of 1665 is not to be paralleled in 
history, and that it is not the stoutest courage that will always support men in such 
cases ... . I recommend it to the charity of all good people to look back and 
reflect duly upon the terrors of the time, and whoever does so will see that it is not 
an ordinary strength that could support it. It was not like appearing in the head of 
an army or charging a body of horse in the field , but it was charging Death itself 
on his pale horse ; to stay was indeed to die, and it could be esteemed nothing 
less . ... " 3 
Is this not a little closer to what must be said by a third party, an outsider 
seeking to consider what Dr. Watson and his colleagues ought to do when 
pursuit of their calling means considerable personal risk? What Dr. 
Watson quite readily says to Holmes might have been unseemly if spoken 
to the good doctor by Mrs. Hudson. And yet , as the citizens of London 
had some sense of the obligations of physicians, even an outsider can gain 
some understanding of a calling not his own. It is in that spirit that I turn to 
consider the obligations of caregivers to patients with AIDS (or patients 
who are HIV+). But, keeping in mind my own calling, I shall begin 
elsewhere. 
Near the end of St. Augustine's life, as North Africa was threatened in 
the early 5th century by barbarian attacks, an African bishop, Honoratus, 
had written Augustine, asking whether it might be permissible for a priest 
to flee in order to escape the threat.4 We do not have that letter, but it 
appears from Augustine's reply that Honoratus must have appealed to a 
number of possible scriptural warrants. He seems to have quoted Jesus' 
words to the Twelve in Matthew 10:23: "When they persecute you in one 
town, flee to the next." As precedent, he also appealed to an escape by St. 
Paul from Damascus, when Paul was let down over the city wall in a 
basket at night in order to escape those who were plotting to kill him (Acts 
9:25; 2 Cor. 11:33). And Honoratus may even have appealed to the 
example of Jesus Who, as an infant, escaped into Egypt, fleeing from 
Herod. Why, he wanted to know, could not a priest of the Church do 
likewise? 
An Interesting Response 
Augustine's response is both interesting and instructive - especially for 
us as we think about the obligations of caregivers in risky circumstances. 
Discussions within the public forum about these obligations have tended 
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to give voice to two positions. Some, a minority I believe, have contended 
that it was quite acceptable for physicians (or other health care personnel) 
to refuse to run the risk of treating AIDS patients. Others have responded 
by appealing to the obligation of the physician to care for anyone who is ill. 
We can, I think, learn from the Bishop of Hippo that the moral life is more 
complicated than either of these views alone. 
The fundamental principle laid down by Augustine in responding to 
Honoratus is simple and straightforward: "There should be no shirking of 
the duties of our ministry laid upon us by the charity of Christ" (p. 141). At 
the same time, however, he grants that under some circumstances, a priest 
might permissibly try to escape. For example, consider the case of St. Paul 
fleeing Damascus. He was right to do so, Augustine thinks, for his enemies 
were seeking only him - not Christian clergy generally. Hence, he could 
rightly escape, thereby preserving himselffor future work on behalf of the 
Church, yet still be certain that Christians left behind would not be 
deprived of the care they needed. They could get that care from others who 
were not being sought and , hence, had no need to flee .s This exception, 
though perhaps an interesting one, is not likely to seem very relevant to the 
problem that concerns us , but consider some of Augustine's other 
suggestions. 
Long before the day of cost-benefit analysis , Augustine examines the 
contingencies involved. "We should not desert the plain duties of our 
office, which are certain, for the sake of contingencies which are uncertain" 
(p . 144). It is right to ask about the degree of risk involved, though, of 
course, ordinary cost-benefit analysis must blow up in the hands of one 
who reminds us to reckon into our calculations the fact that God is able, if 
He so wills, to turn away the evils that threaten us in the performance of 
our duty! But more important is the principle hinted at in Augustine's 
treatment of St. Paul's escape and developed explicitly elsewhere in the 
letter: Flight by a priest is permitted as long as others still remain to 
provide priestly care for Christians left behind. Indeed, this principle is 
more important even than the permission to flee that Augustine deduced 
from the example of St. Paul. Suppose Paul had been the object of attack 
but, in his absence, no one else would have remained in Damascus to 
provide priestly care for Christians. Then he must remain, trusting in God 
to turn away the evil that threatens. Thus Augustine summarizes his basic 
principle, suitably qualified , in this way: 
Let the servants of Christ, the ministers of His word and of His sacrament, do 
what He has commanded or permitted. Let them by all means flee from city to 
city when anyone of them is personally sought out by persecutors, so long as the 
Church is not abandoned by others who are not thus pursued . .. (pp. 142f.). 
Honoratus might have been pardoned , however, had he tried one last 
parting shot. We don't know that he did , but he might have asked 
Augustine whether he was not expecting too much of our frail humanity -
whether he had not enunciated too rigorous a standard for many of us to 
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attain. After all, compassion for sufferers is , in certain ways, an unreliable 
motive . Our ability to feel compassion for others who suffer does not 
necessarily give us the strength needed to stand firm and help them. 
Rather, it may suggest a sensitivity to suffering easily transmuted into fear 
for ourselves and our own plight. Helping them, we too may suffer. What 
then? 
Augustine recognizes at several points in his letter that one might be 
"overpowered" by fear or panic. What we must do then, he counsels , is 
pray for the charity that is from God - the charity that says, "Who is weak 
and I am not weak?" (p. 146). If God commands us to stay at our post, we 
must pray that He will give what He commands, Augustine writes , calling 
irresistibly to mind one of the famous refrains of Book X of his 
Confessions. 6 This appeal to the grace of God is, of course, not available to 
us in the public forum where discussions of health care ordinarily take 
place. But even that fact - that such an appeal is not available - is 
instructive. It suggests that we should be careful not to set the standard of 
obligatory behavior too high in contexts where we are unprepared to 
appeal, as Augustine does here, to the grace of God needed to empower 
such behavior. 
In the statement, "The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response", the 
U. S. Catholic Conference Administrative Board commented on the 
question that concerns us here.7 Its statement received a great deal of 
media attention because of the controversy surrounding its seeming 
endorsement of public educational efforts which included information 
about use of prophylactics as a means for preventing the spread of AIDS. 
But the statement was far more wide-ranging, including, for example, the 
following sentences: 
We are greatly concerned that some in the health care professions or working in 
health care institutions refuse to provide medical or dental care for persons 
exposed to the AIDS virus or presumed to be "at risk." We call upon all in the 
health care and support professions to be mindful of their general moral 
obligation, while following accepted medical standards and procedures, to 
provide care for all persons, including those exposed to the AIDS virus.s 
Interestingly, this statement articulates the responsibilities of caregivers 
without distinguishing obligatory from supererogatory performance, 
without Augustine's sense that grace might sometimes be needed to 
empower performance. Whether this is a sufficiently nuanced under-
standing is precisely the problem we want now to consider. 
Thoughts About Obligations 
One common way of thinking about the obligations of physicians and 
other health care personnel is to consider the degree of risk : to weigh the 
benefits to patients of care against possible costs to caregivers. But all this 
really does , I think, is encourage us to ask questions which cannot be 
straightforwardly answered - leaving us, then, simply to follow our 
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inclinations or intuitions. How great a risk does the physician run in 
treating AIDS patients? Not very great, we are customarily told . That 
answer assumes, of course, that the results of about five years of study and 
experience will hold up in the longer run , and the scientific temperament 
itself might advise caution about such a judgment. Perhaps the answer 
may also seem more persuasive to a psychiatrist than to, say, a 
nephrologist or surgeon . Then, too , the answer does not itself instruct us 
how to reckon into our calculations the fact that the risk, even if small in 
degree, is deadly should it become reality. I suppose physicians are more at 
risk of contracting the common cold than the AIDS virus - which only 
suggests that degree of risk may not be the most important consideration. I 
am not persuaded that such approaches are likely to enhance our capacity 
to discern what a caregiver ought to do , and I turn therefore in a different 
direction. 
The AIDS crisis has stimulated considerable reflection on the nature of 
the medical profession and the obligations to which professional status 
gives rise . Indeed, this may be one of the few obviously good results of an 
otherwise terrible disease. And one point has begun to become clear, or so 
it seems to me: namely than an ethic which understands the physician / 
patient bond in purely contractual terms will not be sufficient to undergird 
a strong sense of physician responsibility. Thus, for example, Abigail 
Zuger and Steven Miles - themselves physicians - write that we need to 
move away from a "rights model" or a "contract model" of medical care 
toward a "virtue-based model."9 To think of medical care as a right may 
impose obligations upon society to provide it, but that model is not likely 
to constrain the freedom of individual physicians to accept or not accept 
patients whose care may involve some risk. Only in certain circumstances, 
as for example a physician employed in a public hospital, would this model 
generate obligations for particular physicians. Similarly, a contract model 
is likely to obligate only within narrow limits. Physicians need not accept 
any and all patients, and, just as patients are free to sever the relationship 
at any time, so also are physicians, "provided the patient is given sufficient 
opportunity to find another physician."10 
In Quest of an Ethic 
In their search for an ethic that will more strongly require physicians to 
take considerable risks in serving patients, Zuger and Miles turn to the 
concept of virtue. Because of their professional commitments, physicians 
need to develop certain virtues - the behavioral skills which will sustain 
them in faithfully caring for the sick. Zuger and Miles believe that this 
conception may better undergird physician responsibilities to care for 
AIDS patients. Those physicians who "decline to perform ... are falling 
short of an excellence in practice implicit in their professional 
commitment."11 Zuger and Miles might well have quoted an article which, 
in fact, they do cite in their notes - Leon Kass's profound and moving 
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interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath. Kass notes that the oath does not 
set forth , chiefly, contractual obligations to patients; instead, it articula tes 
an obligation to one's teachers and to the profession. "The physician 
stands in the world not as one who claims his rights or demands his due; 
rather he stands gratefully, thankful for the existence of the art of 
medicine, for the devotion of his teacher, for the community of like-
minded healers, and for the privilege of sharing in this noble work."1 2 The 
emphasis, thus, is not on obligations to patients but on commitment to the 
physician's art and the virtues it requires . If this seems self-serving - if, 
indeed , it has sometimes in practice been self-serving - Kass is quite right 
to point out that such a conception may bind a physician far more strongly 
than any contract would be likely to do. "It obliges always and 
unconditionally the physician's full performance, regardless of the 
behavior of the patient or his ability to pay."1 3 It obligates, that is , because 
it commits the physician to the attempt to be or become a person of a 
certain sort, and it makes integrity central to that ideal of excellence. 
This turn to the virtues , to an attempt to depict the meaning of 
professional commitment on the part of physicians or other caregivers , is 
surely attractive in many ways. Indeed, it is, I think, a turn in the right 
direction. But as it stands, it is too unqualified. We need to add some 
complexities that arise when we remember (I) others to whom physicians 
may have obligations, and (2) that it is not wise to permit the whole of a 
person's identity to be swallowed up in his or her professional 
commitment. 
Call to mind a picture deeply entrenched in our cultural and religious 
consciousness: A young knight dressed in armor, carrying lance, sword 
and helmet , rides his war charger out of Assisi to do battle against a 
neighboring town in 12th century Italy. He is a brave youth, but, seeing a 
wretched leper along the road, he spurs his horse to flee the dreadful sight. 
As he gallops by, however, he seems to recognize Christ in the contorted 
face of the outcast. Abruptly he stops , dismounts, kisses the leper, gives 
him alms, seats him on his charger, and leads him to his destination. The 
virtues St. Francis displays here are not unlike those of the Samaritan in 
Jesus' well-known story. Heedless of his own concerns or needs, that 
Samaritan, too , helped a man lying by the roadside. And in telling the 
story, Jesus makes clear what we owe any human being in need . The story 
is powerful precisely because it confronts us with a pristinely pure situation 
of one human being in need and another equipped to bring help . The 
Samaritan evidently has no children back home whose needs require that 
he keep some money in his checkbook. But this is not the way life often 
seems to be for most of us, who may not be called to be St. Francis. 
Very often - almost always, surely - we find ourselves committed in 
different ways to different people, and , therefore, obligated in a number of 
ways. To describe such circumstances in the language of virtue will not 
dissipate our problem. The compassion and loyalty a woman physician 
feels for her patients are not virtues entirely distinct from the compassion 
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and loyalty she feels for her children. Suppose she is a nephrologist who 
must dialyze HIV+ patients. Suppose also that she is pregnant. What are 
her obligations? What would virtues like compassion and loyalty dispose 
her to do? I, at least, would not be prepared to argue that her professional 
commitment unremittingly requires her to dialyze those patients. The 
profession of physician does not swallow up the totality of her life. As 
Augustine thought, albeit with some reluctance, that a priest might flee so 
long as another remained behind and the Christian community was not 
abandoned, one might argue that such a physician, assuming she does not 
abandon her patients to no care at all, does no wrong and falls short of no 
excellence the profession of physician requires. 
This argument should not be pressed too far, however. Such a physician, 
I have suggested, is bound by other ties as well, not only by the 
commitments of her profession. She may, for example, consider carefully 
what she owes her children, or the unborn child she is carrying, when 
deciding her duties as a nephrologist. Just as physicians have always had to 
make such judgments in the most elementary of ways - when they parcel 
out their time between profession and family - so also in these 
circumstances the physician's selfhood is not swallowed by her 
professional commitment or, if it is, it ought not be. But at the same time, 
she dare not forget that her most important legacy to her children may be 
the image of care-full, self-giving commitment to the needs of others which 
she imprints upon their memory. We may conclude that turning from a 
contract-based to a virtue-based model of medical care will not 
unqualifiedly obligate physicians, even though this model may well 
capture more successfully the meaning of professional commitment. 
Criticism of Recommendation 
From a rather different direction, Edmund Pellegrino has criticized the 
recommendation of Zuger and Miles that we learn to think of the medical 
profession in terms of its characteristic virtues. 14 If I now proceed to 
disagree with him as well, I do so with some trepidation, since Pellegrino is 
a wise physician from whom much can be learned . He is dissatisfied with 
the argument of Zuger and Miles because - staking so much on the 
concept of virtues, excellences that should be developed within the 
profession - it suggests, erroneously he argues , that "altruism is 
nonobligatory" for physicians. By contrast, he claims that there are three 
reasons internal to the profession of medicine which distinguish it from 
some other occupations and make altruism obligatory for physicians. 
First , the very nature of illness makes the sick person especially 
vulnerable and dependent, forced to place considerable trust in the 
physician. And, Pellegrino writes, such a medical need in itself"constitutes 
a moral claim on those equipped to help." This seems to me essentially 
correct, but inadequate to support Pellegrino's claim that altruism is 
obligatory for the physician. It indicates that medical need constitutes a 
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prima facie claim on the physician, but I cannot see that this claim must 
always be stronger than others . To remain with the example I used earlier, 
the children of a physician are also in a "uniquely dependent, anxious, 
vulnerable, and exploitable state" with respect to their parent. Of that 
state, we might also say what Pellegrino says of the patient's condition: it 
"in itself constitutes a moral claim on those equipped to help ." 
The weight of the argument must therefore be borne by the second and 
third reasons Pellegrino gives - reasons which are very closely connected. 
He argues that those who enter the medical profession "are automatically 
parties to a collective covenant" which is not to be interpreted unilaterally 
by them, and that "this covenant is publicly acknowledged when the 
physician takes an oath at graduation." These are powerful arguments. 
Physicians surely owe a considerable debt to the community for the 
knowledge and skill they have acquired - knowledge and skill for which 
they will be rewarded with considerable affluence. The cost of their 
training has been subsidized in certain ways. More important, they are 
indebted to generations of patients who have offered themselves as 
subjects for experiments or objects of study in a teaching hospital - or, 
even, as quasi-experimental subjects in the early years of a physician's 
practice. 15 It is important, therefore, that physicians not understand their 
care of the sick in purely philanthropic terms, as if they had not also been 
needy recipients . Pellegrino is right, I think, to argue that covenant 
characterizes the physician's role better than contract and that some 
measure of altruism is therefore obligatory. 
William F. May, whose viewpoint is not unlike Pellegrino's, has noted 
that grounding obligations of physicians in contract is a way of trying to 
keep commitments limited - an understandable way, let us hasten to add, 
since one may well drown in the sea of human need . Physician contractors, 
May says, "dart in and out of the patient's world of need , . .. guard their 
own interest, specifying carefully the precise amount of time and service 
for sale."16 By contrast, "covenants cut deeper into personal identity .... 
Initiation into a profession means, in effect, that the physician is a healer 
when healing and when sleeping . .. " (p. 119). This is Pellegrino's point , a 
powerful one. We should notice, though, that even Pellegrino does not 
press it quite as far as one might have expected. Referring to the 
physician's oath, he concludes: "Some degree of effacement of self-interest 
is thus present in every medical oath."1 7 
Let us pursue that "some degree." I have suggested that obligations of 
physicians to patients may be limited by their obligations to others. But, 
still more, their obligations may be limited simply because professional 
commitment does not encompass the totality of the physician's person. At 
some point obligation ceases, and continued service becomes supereroga-
tory. Without thinking of physicians simply as contractors we can and 
should say that. How much can be required of physicians? Must one be St. 
Francis redivivus to enter the profession? May notes that , interpreted in 
ways not unlike his own and Pellegrino's, "a covenantal ethic would appear 
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to contribute to a self-consuming, eventually destructive commitment" 
(p. 183). We are likely to avoid this , he thinks, only if we do not uproot the 
concept of covenant from its original context - a religious one. 
One cannot fully appreciate the indebtedness of a human being by toting up the 
varying sacrifices and investments made by others in his or her favor. The sense 
that one inexhaustibly receives presupposes a more transcendent source of 
donative activity than the sum of gifts received from others .... Thus action 
which at a human level appears gratuitous, in that a specific gratuity from 
another human being does not provoke it , still, at its deepest level , as gift , 
answers to gift (p. 129). 
May suggests that such a notion of covenant, grounded in the religious 
sense of oneself as an inexhaustibly needy recipient of divine grace, may 
produce "an inner freedom and nonchalance that make a deeper 
commitment to others possible" (p. 184). It may permit a physician "to 
function in a 'hardship post,' . .. without being annihilated thereby" 
(p. 184). 
I have quoted May at such length because I believe he does, in fact , lay 
bare the background beliefs that must underlie Pellegrino's vision of the 
physician's role . To the degree that his explication is a perceptive one, 
however, we may again become reluctant to press too rigorous a notion of 
physicians' obligations. Zuger and Miles note that, in the face of the 
Black Death, many medieval cities hired a "plague doctor": "a municipal 
employee who was given a home, a salary, and citizenship; in return he 
agreed to 'treat all patients and visit infected places; in as it shall be found 
to be necessary,' thus relieving his colleagues of this obligation."18 That is 
to say, even in a culture more religious and less pluralistic than ours, the 
morality of plague time seemed to fall back upon contract - upon a sense 
that certain actions were supererogatory for all who had not explicitly 
agreed to undertake them. 19 We may put the point this way: The morality 
of plague time, if that is what we actually face , will inevitably force upon 
us a two-tiered system of caregivers. One way to structure those tiers is to 
distinguish between those physicians who have and who have not 
explicitly contracted to face certain threats. Another way is to encourage 
the development among some physicians of dedication to service that 
goes beyond what can be called obligation. We cannot presume that all 
well-intentioned and sincere physicians know what is, in fact, the ultimate 
truth: that they are inexhaustibly gifted by a transcendent Giver. And 
even for those who do so understand themselves, we cannot presume to 
circumscribe the call of God, as if all were called to be like St. Francis. 
And we should even be willing to recognize, as Augustine was in a very 
different context, that one may be overpowered by fear. We cannot 
command courage because, unlike God , we cannot give what we 
command . We can only seek to instill it , honor those who exemplify it, 
and when we are in need of it, pray, as Augustine says, for the charity 
which is from God. 20 
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